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APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the Trial court err in granting summary judgment

despite extraneous evidence that Mine and Mill and Charter did not
intend their Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease dated
February 11, 1992 to represent their full, complete and integrated
agreement?
2.

Assuming for sake of argument that the Ernest Money

Receipt was an integrated agreement is it ambiguous so that
extraneous evidence should have been considered by the trial court
concerning whether the parties intended the Ernest Money Receipt to
be binding upon them?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
1991).

Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah

The appellate Court accords the trial court's legal

conclusions regarding the contract no deference but reviews them
for correctness. AOK Lands. Inc. v. Shand. Morahan & Company, 860
P.2d 924 (Utah 1993). Wineqar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah
1991). The reviewing Court considers the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party and will affirm only if there is
no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact or if,
accepting the facts as contended for by the losing party, the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine
4

issue of fact exists where, based on the facts and the record,
reasonable minds could differ. West One Trust Company v. Morrison,
221 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mine and Mill brings this appeal to obtain reversal of
the trial court's $132,202.55 summary judgment grant in Charter's
favor based on the court's finding, an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Lease, as the final, complete and integrated agreement of
the parties to lease commercial property at 5914 South 350 West,
Murray, Utah, despite evidence that the parties did not intend it
as their integrated agreement and ambiguity on the face of the
Earnest Money Receipt.
Course of Proceedings
1.

Charter filed a Complaint against Mine and Mill on

May 5, 1992 which was subsequently served upon Mine and Mill.
(Record, Page 2 ) .
2.

Mine and Mill filed an Answer to the Complaint on

May 29, 1992. (Record, Page 40).
3.

Charter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with

supporting memoranda and affidavit on March 24, 1993. (Record, Page
85) .
4.

Mine and Mill filed a Memorandum in Opposition on

April 12, 1993 (Record, Page 118) with the supporting affidavit of
Ashok Patwardhan dated April 5, 1993.
5.

(Record, Page 134).

On April 19, 1993, Charter filed a Motion to Strike

paragraphs 13 through 17 of the Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan,
Paragraphs 4 through 54 and 56 through 62 of Defendant's Memorandum
5

in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record,
Page 142) and filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 16, 1993.
6.
Motion

to

Mine and Mill filed its Motion in Opposition to

Strike Affidavit

of Ashok

Patwardhan

and

Certain

Paragraphs of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition (Record, Page
154), and a Request for Hearing (Record, Page 170).
Disposition in Lower Court
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike

of Charter came before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, District
Court Judge for hearing on Monday, October 18, 1993.
2.

After hearing arguments of counsel for the parties,

the Court took the matter under advisement and on October 27, 1993
entered its minute entry granting Charter's Motion for Summary
Judgment, denying Charter's Motion to strike and directing Charter
to prepare an appropriate order reflecting the Court's ruling
(Record, Page 176).
3.

The Court entered Summary Judgment against Mine and

Mill in the form prepared by Charter for $132,202.55 on November
24, 1993 (Record, Page 225).
Statement of Facts
A statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for
review is as follows:
1.

On or about February 11, 1992 Ashok Patwardhan as

president of Mine and Mill Engineering Inc. signed an "Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Lease" (Record, Page 8) in the form
prepared by Charter along with two separate addendum/counter offers

6

("Earnest Money Receipt")•
2.

The Earnest Money Receipt states:
a.

"First months rent plus security deposit in the
amount of the last month's rent payable upon
signing final lease agreement." (Record, Page
8).

b.

"Within 10 days after tender of a firm lease
prepared by landlord in a form consistent with
the

above

provisions

containing

other

customary and reasonable general provisions,
the parties agree to execute a written lease
which

will

supersede

and

abrogate

this

agreement. (Record, Page 8 ) .
c.

"It is understood and agreed that the terms
listed in this receipt constitute the entire
preliminary contract between the tenant and
landlord, and that no verbal statement made by
anyone relative to this transaction shall be
construed
unless

to be part

incorporated

of this
in

transaction

writing

herein."

(Record, Page 8 ) .
d.

"May go up to 9,000 S.F." (Record, Page 9 ) .

e.

"Tenant agrees to pay in addition to the
rental amount, the amount of **$1,000.00
per month to landlord for the term of this
lease to cover landlordfs investment to this
extent.
•^negotiable" (Record, Page 9 ) .
7

f.

"Rent to begin at time of occupancy." (Record,
Page 10).

g.

Changes were made to the addenda to the Earnest
Money Receipt with the initials "A. P." but no
initials

appear

from

a

representative

of

Charter. (Record, Page 10).
3.

At the time they signed the Earnest Money Receipt,

Mr. Patwardhan for Mine and Mill Engineering and Charter's agent
agreed that the Earnest Money Receipt was just a formality showing
the potential
building.

interest

of Mine and Mill

Engineering

in the

The parties agreed that it was not binding on Mine and

Mill Engineering in the event that two other parties, Precision
Systems Engineering ("PSE") and Environ, decided not to sign it as
well; that it was necessary to enter into initial negotiations for
the lease or purchase of the building and that any final agreement
would be subject to negotiation and approval by all three parties
as tenant.

(Record, Pages 134-139).
4.

As

contemplated

by

the Earnest

Money

Receipt,

Plaintiff prepared a "firm lease" agreement titled "Commercial and
Industrial Lease."

This lease was presented to and signed by

Ashok Patwardhan as president of Mine and Mill Engineering with the
same understanding that it would not become effective until and
unless it was signed by Precision System Engineering and Environ
Company L. C. who were also named as Lessees under the Commercial
and Industrial Lease. (Record, Page 3 Paragraph 5, Page 13-28,
Pages 134-139).
5.

The trial court refused to consider the events
8

surrounding the execution and purported delivery of the Earnest
Money Receipt and the Commercial and Industrial Lease. It held the
Earnest Money Receipt "clear and unambiguous."

The lower court

granted Charter's Motion for Summary Judgment for $132,202.55 plus
additional damages incurred after April 1, 1993.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Application of the parol evidence rule requires an
initial factual determination by the Court that an integrated
writing exists intended by the parties to represent their full,
complete and final agreement.

The finder of fact must consider

extraneous evidence when deciding if the parol evidence rule
applies.

An agreement considered by the parties to be interim or

preliminary is not an integrated writing.

Where parties execute

two documents in the course of the same transaction that concern
the same subject matter, the court must read both together to
determine

the intent of the parties to enter an

integrated

agreement.
Here Charter prepared the Commercial and Industrial
lease as contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt.
executed it.

The parties

The court apparently ignored it in entering JSummary

Judgment against Mine and Mill.

Evidence concerning the binding

effect of the parties1 signature to a document goes to their intent
to enter an integrated contract. The parol evidence rule does not
apply to the exclusion of such evidence because a fact issue exists
whether the parties entered into an integrated agreement.
The trial court found that the Earnest Money Agreement
signed by the parties was "clear and unambiguous" (Record, Page
225) .

A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used are
9

insufficient because the contract may be understood to reach two or
more plausible meanings.

The Earnest Money Receipt contemplates

a "firm lease" to follow.
"preliminary contract."

It refers to the Earnest Money as a
Rent is payable only upon signing the

final lease or taking possession of the property.

The Earnest

Money Receipt contains changes initialed by Mine and Mill but not
by Charter.

One could plausibly construe all of these provisions

to mean that the parties did not intend the Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Lease to form their final agreement. Other provisions
may plausibly be construed to have a contrary meaning. The Earnest
Money Receipt is ambiguous on its face.
Considering both the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Lease and the subsequently executed Commercial and Industrial Lease
as the documents making up the transaction, the agreement is
ambiguous.

The Earnest Money Receipt does not specifically refer

to parties other than Mine and Mill Engineering and Charter.

The

Commercial and Industrial Lease clearly refers to other parties
necessary to the Agreement.

Viewing the two documents together,

they have contrary meanings and are ambiguous.
FIRST ARGUMENT
The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment
Despite Evidence that Mine and Mill and Appellee Did Not
Intend their Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Lease to
Represent Their Full Complete, and Integrated Agreement
A.

Before the Parol Evidence Rule can apply to execute
extraneous evidence there must be an integrated
writing.
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.. 731

P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) the trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment of Colonial Leasing.

The Trial court rejected Larsen
10

Bros.f argument that the lease was really a security agreement
subject to the requirements in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code relating to the disposition of collateral and that Colonial
was precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment.

The Supreme

Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
In discussing the parol evidence rule, the Supreme Court
stated at pages 486-487:
The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude evidence of
terms in addition to those in a written integrated
agreement tf[T]he rule operates in the absence of fraud to
exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
representations offered for the purpose of varying or
adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Union
Bank v. Swenson, 707 P. 2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). See
also Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 683 P.2d 1190, 1194
(Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d
261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972); Corbin, The Parol
Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 609 (1944). Because the
parol evidence rule applies only if the writing was
intended by the parties to represent the full and
complete agreement of the parties, the trial court must
first determine whether the writing was intended to be an
integrated agreement. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665; Eie,
638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog Marina, 28 Utah 2d at 266, 501
P.2d at 270. In some cases, it will be necessary for a
trial judge to rule on the issue of integration as a
preliminary or foundational matter. See Halloran-Judge
Trust Co. V. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342

(1927).

In this case, the trial judge did not expressly rule
whether the purported lease was an integrated writing.
Since the affidavits raise a factual issue as to whether
the contract was in fact intended to be integrated, the
trial judge will need to hear the evidence on that issue.
Indeed, the need for parol evidence is also suggested by
the nature and terms of the lease itself and the
surrounding circumstances.
It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous
because of lack of clarity in the meaning of particular
terms, it is subject to parol evidence as to what the
parties intended with respect to those terms. Faulkner
v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983).
See also
Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery Co., 29 Wash.
App. 725, 631 P.2d 389 (1981). We hold that that rule
also applies where the character of the written agreement
itself is ambiguous even though its specific terms are
not ambiguous, [citations omitted].
11

The Court concluded that:
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and
unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a
motion for summary judgment. Morris v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 658 P. 2d 1199, 1201 (Utah
1983) . If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms
of the agreement is to be determined by the jury. Id.;
Amiacs Interwest. Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 53,
55 (Utah 1981).
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., supra at
488.
In the instant case, the trial judge did not expressly
rule whether the Earnest Money Receipt was an integrated writing.
The Court's Order states,

M

. • . the Earnest Money Agreement

signed by the parties was clear and unambiguous, . . . "

(Record,

Pages 225-226). The Summary Judgment does not address whether the
Agreement was intended by the parties to be their "full and
complete agreement."

(Record, Pages 225-228). Ashok Patwardhan's

Affidavit raises factual issues as to whether the Earnest Money
Receipt was in fact intended to be the integrated agreement of the
parties.

(See Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan, Record, Pages 164-

169, Paragraphs 8-17).

The trial judge should hear evidence on

that issue.
The nature and the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt
itself also suggest the need for parol evidence. (Record, Page 8) .
The Earnest Money Receipt states on its face, "First monthfs rent
plus Security Deposit in the amount of the last month's rent
payable upon signing final lease agreement".

The second addenda

states "Rent to begin at time of occupancy." (Record, Page 10). It
calls itself a

"Preliminary Contract" and provides that a "firm

lease" setting forth all of the agreements between the parties
12

would be executed later (Record, Page 8).

According to the first

addenda, the

is uncertain

additional

amount

rent

of

space

covered

for improvements

"negotiable" (Record, Page 9) .

to be made by

and the

landlord

is

All of these provisions suggest

that the parties did not execute the Earnest Receipt as their "full
and

complete

agreement" and did

not

intend

it to be their

integrated agreement.
B.

An interim or preliminary
integrated writing.

agreement is not an

In Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638 P. 2d 1190 (Utah
1981) the parties entered what they characterized as an "Interim
Agreement" with the parties' attorneys to prepare their final
agreement. The "Interim Agreement" set forth the amount to be paid
per ambulance service call.

The Supreme Court found that the

Interim Agreement was not the final agreement between the parties
by its very terms.

The Court found that the trial court properly

considered parol evidence at trial.

That evidence supported the

claim the parties intended their Interim Agreement as a tentative
agreement.
In Eie as in this case, the writing referred to final
documentation to follow.
The Earnest Money Receipt states:
"Within ten days after tender of firm lease prepared by
Landlord in a form consistent with the above provisions
and containing other customary and reasonable general
provisions, the parties agree to execute a written lease
which will supersede and abrogate this agreement (Record,
Page 8)."
In Eie as in the present case# the writing showed on its face that
it was interim or preliminary to a final agreement by the parties
(Pages 8-10).

The Earnest Money Receipt states, "It is understood
13

and agreed that the terms written in this receipt constitute the
entire Preliminary Contract between the tenant and landlord, . • ."
(Record, Page 8).

The Earnest Money Receipt indicates on its fact

that it was not intended as the final agreement of the parties and
so the parol evidence rule does not apply.
C.

Where two documents are executed in the course of
the same transaction and concern the same subject
matter, both are read together to determine the
rights of the parties.

In Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 28 Utah
2d 261 (1972) , the trial court found that the lease and employment
contract

bore

a

relationship

considered as one agreement.

to

one

another

and

should

be

Since the issue of whether the

contracts should be integrated was a factual question, and that
substantial evidence existed to support the determination of the
trial judge, the Supreme Court sustained his finding.

The trial

court did not err in following the rule of law that two or more
instruments executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at
different times in the course of the same transaction, concerning
the same subject matter, will be read and construed together to
determine the respective rights and interests of the parties,
although they do not in terms refer to each other.
Here we have two agreements prepared in the course of the
same

transaction.

One

contemplates the other.
the

facts

and

of

these

agreements

refers

to

and

The trial court erred in not considering

circumstances

surrounding

determine the integration issue.

the

transaction

to

Charter prepared the document

contemplated to be the final and complete expression of the
parties1 agreement (Record, Page 3, Paragraph 5).
14

By preparing the

Commercial and Industrial Lease Charter acknowledged that it did
not consider the Earnest Money Receipt to be an

integrated

agreement.
The Commercial and Industrial Lease drafted by Charter
imposes obligations on both parties beyond those set forth in the
"preliminary" Earnest Money Receipt. These include the obligation
of the tenant to provide liability insurance at specified levels
(Record, Pages 16-17, Paragraph III, 15), to pay for all property
taxes, not just increases (Record, Page 15, Paragraph III, 8 ) , and
to increase the amount of space leased (Record, Page 13, Paragraph
I) .

The Commercial and Industrial Lease also imposes additional

obligations

on

Charter

including,

but

not

limited

to, the

obligation to repair the roof for the first year (Record, Pages 1415,

Paragraph

III,

6).

Most

important,

the

"firm

lease"

contemplated by the Earnest Money Receipt and set forth in the
Commercial and Industrial Lease identifies all of the parties who
would be tenants (Record, Page 5, Pages 13 and 20). These are fact
issues and not the subject for summary judgment.
D.

Extraneous evidence concerning the binding effect
of a signature to a document goes to the intent of
the parties to enter an integrated contract.

In Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P. 2d 663 (Utah 1985) the
bank brought an action to recover on a promissory note. Defendants
who had signed the note individually and personally answered that
they did not intend their signatures to have the effect of
personally binding them. The representatives of the bank promised
them their signatures were for appearance only and the bank would
not bring a collection action against them personally.

The bank

moved for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court.
15

The Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material
fact existed whether the parties intended an integrated note. These
preclude summary judgment. The signatories were not as a matter of
law foreclosed from asserting defenses based on fraud by their
failure to use the term "fraud" or a derivative thereof, or by
their failure to allege each and every element of common law fraud.
As in Union Bank, Mine and Mill presented evidence that
Charter represented its president's signature would not bind it
(Record, Pages 166-168, Affidavit of Ashok Patwardhan, Paragraphs
11, 13, 15, 16, and 17). The instant case is also similar to Union
Bank in that the Court must first determine whether the parties
intended their writing as an integration.
In Cox v. Berrv 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575, the Court
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on other
grounds but commented on some contentions made by the parties.
Some parties urged that they were not bound by a hold harmless
agreement because the signatures of some intended signers were
never obtained.

The Court observed that whether the parties

signing the agreement were bound depended upon the agreement.

If

it appears that part of the consideration for signing required
others to sign and be bound jointly with them, they have not
entered into an agreement.

The Court went on to observe that such

uncertainties emphasize the necessity and propriety of trial and
taking evidence as to the background and circumstances of the
transaction in order to decide what the parties intended.

Id. at

579.
Here, Mine and Mill presented evidence that the parties
agreed it would not be bound unless PSE and Environ also entered
16

the lease. (Record, Pages 166-168)•
Viewing

the

facts of this case

in the

light most

favorable to appellant, the Earnest Money Receipt (Record, Page 810) , the contemporaneous understandings surrounding execution of
the agreements (Record, Pages 166-168), and the subsequent course
of dealing by the parties (Record, Page 3, Paragraph 5 and Page 13)
establish that they did not intend the Earnest Money Receipt to be
the final and complete expression of their agreement.
Here the Earnest Money
further

documentation.

documentation

prepared

It
by

is

Charter

Receipt
clear
and

itself
from

the

the

contemplates
subsequent

affidavit

of the

president of Mine and Mill that the other two entities sharing
liability on the lease was a condition precedent to Mine and Mill
being a party to the lease.

The trial court should consider

extrinsic evidence in determining whether the parties intended the
Earnest Money Receipt to represent their full, complete and
integrated agreement.

Mine and Mill presented issues of material

fact as the parties1 intent regarding the Earnest Money Receipt as
an integrated contract.

These fact issues preclude the grant of

summary judgment.
SECOND ARGUMENT
Even if the Earnest Money Receipt Was An Integrated
Contract it is Ambiguous So That Extraneous Evidence
Should have been Considered By The Trial Court
Concerning Its Effect
A.

A contract is considered ambiguous if the words used
are insufficient because the contract may
be
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings.

In West One Trust Co. v. Morrison. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
(Utah App. 1993), a father and son acquired three pieces of real
17

property by warranty deed to them as "joint tenants with full
rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common."

There was

extrinsic evidence that the father and son were really dealing as
partners and not as joint tenants.

After the hearing, the trial

court concluded that the three deeds conveying the property were
clear and unambiguous on their face. The father and son held title
to

the

properties

survivorship.

as

joint

tenants

with

full

rights

of

The personal representative of the father's estate

appealed the trial court's ruling arguing that the deeds did not
demonstrate the party's true intent and that parol evidence was
admissible to demonstrate a mutual mistake occurred in the case.
The Court of Appeals stated:
Exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist, however,
when there is an issue as to whether the parties intended
the writing as an integrated contract, and when "what
appears to be a complete and binding integrated agreement
. . . may be voidable for fraud, duress, mistake or the
like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes
need not and commonly do not appear on the face of the
writing." [Caption omitted] Therefore, parol evidence
may be admissible to show mutual mistake, occurring
"•when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon
which they base their bargain.'" [Citation omitted]
In addition, a mutual mistake theory may apply to
instances where the parties misunderstood the legal
effect of the words in a document and may result in
reformation of a deed. "It is well settled that mistakes
as to the legal effect of words used in a contract or
deed, . . . are subject to reformation by the courts."
(Id. at P. 13).
The Court concluded:
"Based on the foregoing, parol evidence is admissible to
demonstrate that a mutual mistake resulted in a document
which does not accurately reflect the intent of the
parties. If the mutual mistake is established by clear
and convincing evidence, a document may be reformed." Id.
The Earnest Money Receipt states,
18

"Within ten days after tender of a firm lease prepared by
a landlord in a form consistent with the above provisions
and containing other customary and reasonable general
provisions, the parties agree to execute a written lease
which will supersede and abrogate this agreement.
. . . It is understood and agreed that the terms written
in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary
Contract between the tenant and landlord, . . ."
(emphasis added). (Record, Page 8 ) .
The Court of Appeals of Utah has determined that,
A contract is considered ambiguous if "the words used to
express the meaning and intention of the parties are
insufficient in the sense that the contract may be
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings."
(citations omitted). C. J. Realty, Inc.. v. Willey 758
P. 2d 923 (Utah App. 1988).
The Earnest Money Receipt contemplates a "firm lease"
prepared by Charter in a consistent form (Record Page 8, Lines 3638) .
lease.

One can easily understand this to mean the firm or binding
If the "firm lease" does follow, this contract language

could plausibly be understood as intended by the parties to mean
that the Earnest Money Receipt is not firm or binding.
When the Earnest Money Receipt refers to a "Preliminary
Contract"

(Record, Page 8, Lines 41-42) one could plausibly

understand Mine and Mill and Charter to intend the Earnest Money
Receipt as introductory, initiatory, preceding, temporary, and
provisional.

The Earnest Money Receipt does not provide for

payment of rent until all contemplated parties sign the "firm
lease" or tenant occupies the premises (Record, Page 8, Lines 12-13
and Page 10). These provisions could plausibly be understood to
mean the parties intended that Mine & Mill have no obligation to
pay until that time. The requirements of the Earnest Money Receipt
could also plausibly be understood to mean that it does constitute
some type of agreement between the parties as contended by Charter.
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Since the Earnest Money Receipt uses insufficient words
to express the meaning and intention of the parties and the
contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings
it is ambiguous.
The Court of Appeals has stated, "If the contract is
ambiguous, 'extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent must be
received and considered in an effort to glean what the parties
actually agreed to." West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, supra.
at 929.
B.

If two documents making U P the transaction can be
plausibly understood to have contrary meanings, the
agreement is ambiguous.

In Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P. 2d 104 (Utah 1991) the
Supreme Court faced an assignment of the seller's interest in a
contract

to

convey

property

assignment and a warranty deed.

documented

by

an

agreement

of

The Court had to decide whether

the assignee of the seller's interest had an obligation to convey
title of the property to the buyer after the buyer paid in full.
The trial court granted Summary Judgment.
reversed and remanded.

The Supreme Court

The analysis used by the Supreme Court is

helpful and instructive. The Court set forth the applicable law as
follows:
In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties
are controlling, [citation omitted] If the contract is
in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the
intention of the parties must be determined from the
words of the agreement, [citation omitted]. A court may
only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or
uncertain, [citation omitted]. A contract provision is
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms,
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies, [citation
omitted]. Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a
question of law. Faulkner, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293. In this
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case, the trial court granted the Winegars' motion for
summary judgment. The only parol evidence offered came
from the Froerers and wholly supported their position.
We must therefore assume that the trial court found the
contract unambiguous and must have thus disregarded the
Froerers' evidence. We may uphold the trial court's
ruling only if we agree that the contract was
unambiguous. As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch,
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977), we first
examine the language of the instrument, according to it
the weight and effect it shows the parties intended. If
the meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, parol evidence of
the parties' intentions should be admitted. A motion for
summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion
is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a
factual issue as to what the parties intended, [citation
omitted].
Id. at 108.
The Court then analyzed the two documents that made
up the assignment agreement.

It interpreted one as assigning the

obligation to convey title while the other suggested a contrary
intent.

In its conclusion, the Court stated:
It is not difficult to see how the trial court was
tempted to "weigh" these competing interpretations to
determine what effect to give this agreement.
Unfortunately, weighing evidence is proper only when
making findings of fact, not when determining questions
of law in interpreting a contract on a motion for summary
judgment. There is sufficient ambiguity regarding the
intentions of the parties to this transaction that the
trial court could not properly resolve this action in the
Winegars' favor as a matter of law. We therefore reverse
and remand this case for trial on the issue of intent.
Id. at 111.
As applied to the facts of this case, the summary

judgment states that, "The earnest money agreement signed by the
parties was clear and unambiguous."

Therefore, this Court may

uphold the trial court's ruling only if it agrees that the Earnest
Money Receipt was unambiguous. It is also clear from the language
of the trial court's order that

it

failed to consider the

Commercial and Industrial Lease agreement prepared and tendered by
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Plaintiff to be the "firm lease" between the parties.
The Commercial and Industrial Lease agreement named "Mine
and Mill Engineering, a Utah Corp., Precision Systems Engineering,
a Utah Corp., Environ Company, a Utah Limited Company, as tenants
to act as joint tenants with Mine and Mill Engineering acting as
contracting agent for the tenants."

(Record, Pages 13 and 20).

Charter prepared and tendered the Commercial and Industrial Lease
naming and providing for execution by all three. The Earnest Money
Receipt contemplates that Charter would prepare and tender a "firm
lease"

which

would

supersede

and

abrogate

the

"Preliminary

Contract" known as the Earnest Money Receipt.
Following analysis of the Supreme Court in Winegar, there
is an ambiguity in the Ernest Money Receipt viewed alone and in the
documentation viewed as a whole.

The Earnest Money Receipt only

names Mine and Mill Engineering, Inc. as a tenant whereas the
Commercial and Industrial Lease names PSE and Environ along with
Mine and Mill Engineering, Inc. as tenants.

One could plausibly

understand it to mean that Mine and Mill Engineering was to be the
only tenant.

One could plausibly understand the Commercial and

Industrial Lease to mean all three entities would share the space.
Viewing the documents together they have contrary meanings and are
ambiguous.
The Earnest Money Receipt is ambiguous on its face. As
stated above, it could be construed to obligate Mine and Mill to
make payments only upon execution of the "firm lease" or upon
occupancy.

One could interpret it as the full and complete

agreement of the parties.

When such an ambiguity exists, the

finder of fact must consider extraneous evidence to determine the
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parties' true intent. When viewing the transaction as a whole, the
Earnest Money Receipt and Commercial and Industrial Lease differed
concerning whom the tenant would be.

Consideration of extrinsic

evidence is appropriate given such an ambiguity,
CONCLUSION
Applying the standard of appellate review to grants of
summary judgment, the trial court erred
without

first considering

extraneous

in granting judgment

evidence

concerning

the

parties' intention whether the Earnest Money Receipt was their
full, complete and integrated agreement. Before the Parol Evidence
Rule can apply to exclude extraneous evidence, the trial court must
make a preliminary ruling that an integrated writing exists. Mine
and Mill has raised factual issues.

The language of the Earnest

Money Receipt, the course of dealing leading up to execution of the
Earnest Money Receipt and the parties' subsequent course of dealing
raises factual issues. Charter's preparation of the Commercial and
Industrial Lease also raises factual issues.

These all establish

that the parties did not intend the Earnest Money Agreement as
their integrated agreement.
Even if the Earnest Money was an integrated agreement, it
is ambiguous whether viewed alone or in connection with the
subsequent commercial and industrial lease. The trial court should
have considered extraneous evidence concerning the true intent of
the parties.
Applying the standard of appellate review to the issues
of this case requires reversal of the trial court's order grating
summary judgment and remand of this case for further proceedings.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Mine and
23

Mill, genuine disputes exist as to material

issues of fact.

Accepting the facts as contended by Mine and Mill, Charter is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The grant of Summary

Judgment by the trial court was not appropriate because genuine
issues of material fact exist.
For

the

reasons

set

forth

herein,

Mine

and

Mill

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
grant

of Summary

Judgment

and remand

this

case

for further

proceedings.
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